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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
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WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. ("FE&B") appeals the 
denial of its entire fees application.  The bankruptcy court 
found that during the course of FE&B's representation of Charter 
Technologies, Incorporated, d.b.a. Elgin Electronics ("the 
Debtor"), in the context of the Debtor's Chapter 11 proceedings, 
that FE&B had wrongfully represented the interests of the 
Debtor's president and principal shareholder, Joseph Burke.  The 
bankruptcy court found that FE&B had sought to further Mr. 
Burke's interests over the interests of the Debtor by, among 
other things, filing a patently false $4,250,000 lawsuit against 
the counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and 
by making repeated and knowing misrepresentations to the 
bankruptcy court.  The bankruptcy court further found that FE&B 
was motivated throughout its representation of the Debtor by 
subjective bad faith.  Consequently, the bankruptcy court 
sanctioned FE&B by denying its fees application in its entirety.  
On appeal, the district court upheld the denial of FE&B's fees 
application.  The district court did, however, substitute its own 
justifications for the bankruptcy court's action.  Because we 
feel that the bankruptcy court's factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous, and because we find the district court's 
  
justifications for the sanctions to be acceptable, we affirm the 
denial of FE&B's entire fees application. 
 I. BACKGROUND 
 On January 20, 1993, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition 
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  The Debtor also filed a 
motion at this time to employ FE&B as its counsel.  On February 
17, 1993, the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing regarding the 
employment of FE&B.  Based, in part, on the testimony of Alan 
Fellheimer that FE&B would seek to file a reorganization plan for 
the Debtor between March 15 and March 30, 1993, and that FE&B had 
"already arranged . . . a significant equity infusion into the 
company, seven figure infusion, a million dollars," the 
bankruptcy court approved the employment of FE&B.   
 Despite these confident assertions, neither a reorganization 
plan nor a large equity infusion was forthcoming by the end of 
March 1993, and a meeting was subsequently arranged to discuss 
the future of the Debtor.  This meeting, which took place on May 
20, 1993, was attended by Mr. Fellheimer; Mr. Burke; Guy Fustine 
of Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & Sennett, P.C. ("the Knox Firm"), 
counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("the 
Committee"); and certain representatives of the Committee.  The 
representatives of the Committee indicated that the Committee was 
willing to work with the Debtor to solve its financial woes, to 
wit, the Committee would be willing to accept a plan in which the 
unsecured creditors as a whole exchanged debt for equity, or a 
plan in which two members of the Committee--REM Electronics and 
  
Advacom, Incorporated--would extend credit to the Debtor or 
invest cash in the Debtor.   
 The representatives of the Committee also made it clear that 
they lacked confidence in the managerial skills of Mr. Burke:  If 
the Debtor's reorganization plan was hinged upon the long-term 
viability of the Debtor, the Committee pledged to withhold its 
support unless the Debtor's top-level management was replaced--
particularly Mr. Burke.  At this point, Mr. Burke and Mr. 
Fellheimer left the meeting to confer privately.  Upon their 
return, Mr. Fellheimer presented the representatives of the 
Committee with Mr. Burke's demands.  According to Mr. Fellheimer, 
Mr. Burke would agree to leave the management of the Debtor only 
if the reorganization plan provided him with:  (1) a written 
employment contract with the Debtor; (2) an equity position in 
the Debtor; and (3) a release from the personal guarantees Mr. 
Burke had previously executed which secured certain obligations 
of the Debtor.  
 Following this meeting, in a letter dated June 4, 1993, Mr. 
Fustine reiterated the Committee's views regarding Mr. Burke's 
long-term future in the Debtor's management.1  In response, in 
                     
     
1
  In the June 4th letter, Mr. Fustine stated that 
 
  [t]he position of the Committee with respect to 
Joe Burke is clear.  It will not accept any Plan of 
Reorganization which provides for payments over time or 
which provides for the conversion of debt to equity if 
the Plan also provides that Joe Burke will continue in 
a management role.  Joe Burke is believed to be a part 
of the problem and not a part of the cure.  I am 
telling you this again now so that there is no 
confusion in the future. 
  
letters dated June 8 and June 14, 1993, Mr. Fellheimer charged 
Mr. Fustine with representing individual members of the Committee 
and demanded that the Knox Firm withdraw as counsel to the 
Committee and, moreover, that certain members of the Committee 
also withdraw from the Committee.  Mr. Fellheimer furthermore 
threatened to file a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking the 
dismissal of the Knox Firm if the Knox Firm did not voluntarily 
withdraw.  Mr. Fustine and the Knox Firm responded by again 
restating the position of the Committee in a letter to FE&B dated 
June 16, 1993.  That same day, Mr. Fustine and the Knox Firm also 
filed a motion on behalf of the Committee to ratify the 
appointment of Mr. Fustine and the Knox Firm as the Committee's 
counsel.    
 FE&B filed the Debtor's response to the Committee's motion 
to ratify its counsel on June 28, 1993.  FE&B also filed a seven-
count complaint on behalf of the Debtor against Mr. Fustine and 
the Knox Firm seeking $4,250,000 in damages and a preliminary 
injunction to prevent Mr. Fustine and the Knox Firm from 
representing the Committee ("the complaint").  The complaint made 
the following allegations:  Count One charged Mr. Fustine and the 
Knox Firm with breaching their fiduciary duty to the Committee by 
representing individual members of the Committee; Counts Two and 
Three charged Mr. Fustine and the Knox Firm with breaching a 
contract that they had allegedly entered into with the Debtor 
which required them to refrain from communicating with potential 
investors in the Debtor; Counts Four and Five charged Mr. Fustine 
and the Knox Firm with libeling and slandering the Debtor in 
  
their letters of June 4 and June 16, 1993; Count Six charged Mr. 
Fustine and the Knox Firm with intentionally and negligently 
interfering with the Debtor's existing and prospective 
contractual relations; and Count Seven charged Mr. Fustine and 
the Knox Firm with unfairly competing with the Debtor by 
representing individual members of the Committee.  The complaint 
was signed by Jeffrey Eichen of FE&B.        
    Viewing the complaint as an insurmountable barrier to a 
successful reorganization effort, the bankruptcy court quickly 
scheduled a hearing for July 8, 1993.  Mr. Fellheimer telephoned 
the court on July 6, 1993, however, and requested that the 
hearing be rescheduled as Mr. Burke--whose testimony Mr. 
Fellheimer characterized as essential to the complaint--was out 
of the country and would not return before the hearing.  The 
bankruptcy court consequently rescheduled the hearing for August 
3, 1993.  In fact, Mr. Burke was not out of the country and Mr. 
Fellheimer was aware of Mr. Burke's actual whereabouts on the 
same day--July 6, 1993--that he telephoned the bankruptcy court.  
On July 19, 1993, FE&B again sought to delay the hearing by 
filing a motion to postpone the hearing.  In this motion, FE&B 
asserted that Vito Casoni, another allegedly essential witness, 
would be unavailable on the new date of the hearing.  The 
bankruptcy court, however, refused to further reschedule the 
hearing.   
 On July 20, 1993, the Knox Firm, Mr. Fustine, and the 
Committee filed a Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Bankruptcy 
  
Rule 9011 and Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure2 
against FE&B ("the sanction motion").  The sanction motion 
alleged that sanctions were appropriate in that the complaint 
filed by FE&B lacked a reasonable basis in law and in fact and 
that the complaint was filed for improper tactical purposes.   
 In one last salvo before the hearing, FE&B filed a Motion to 
Disqualify Defendants from Acting as Legal Counsel to Witnesses 
("motion to disqualify").  The motion to disqualify alleged that 
Mr. Fustine and the Knox Firm suffered from an irreconcilable 
conflict of interests due to their representation of individual 
members of the Committee and due to their status as parties and 
material witnesses in the litigation on the complaint. 
 On August 3, 1993, the hearing on the Debtor's complaint was 
held.  At the conclusion of the first day of the hearing, Mr. 
Fellheimer sought to withdraw the complaint on behalf of the 
Debtor and to terminate the entire adversary proceeding.  In the 
words of Mr. Fellheimer, the Debtor decided to withdraw the 
complaint "[b]ecause it doesn't see any benefit . . . in 
proceeding in the long run."  Mr. Fellheimer further stated:  "I 
don't want to burden the Court any further with this.  And I also 
feel that . . . the best interest of the debtor would be served 
by ending it and working towards a reorganization."  The 
bankruptcy court then withdrew the complaint and chastised Mr. 
Fellheimer for, in its view, representing the interests of Mr. 
                     
     
2
  Bankruptcy Rule 9011 essentially tracks Rule 11 in all 
pertinent respects, as those rules then existed. 
  
Burke over the interests of the Debtor.3  The Committee reserved 
its right to proceed with its sanction motion at a later date.  
 On August 25, 1993, FE&B filed an interim fees and expenses 
application for the period January 20, 1993, through August 21, 
1993 ("fees application").  FE&B requested $200,275.50 in 
compensation and $21,916.83 for the reimbursement of expenses.  
The Committee thereafter filed an objection to FE&B's fees 
application on September 23, 1993.   
 II. THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
 A. The Bankruptcy Court 
 The bankruptcy court held a hearing on the fees application 
and on the sanction motion on October 20, 1993, and issued its 
                     
     
3
  The bankruptcy court warned: 
 
 [Y]ou're on a knife's edge, Mr. Fellheimer.  You're 
representing Mr. Burke, he has no independent counsel.  
He may be a lawyer himself, but he met with you outside 
the Erie Club in order to determine what he should 
personally get out of the reorganization for him to 
step out as manager.  In that instance you're acting as 
his lawyer.  And that's adverse to the interests of the 
[Debtor]. 
 
  . . . . 
 
  . . . You have to be very careful about how you 
represent Mr. Burke.  Because to the extent that you 
represent him to the detriment of the [Debtor] and the 
creditors, you're violating your fiduciary duty to the 
[Debtor].  And you're representing him individually and 
you're risking whatever fee you might get out of this. 
 
  . . . And for Mr. Burke to get upset because the 
creditors committee thinks that he's incompetent, is 
unfortunate.  You as a lawyer, as a practicing lawyer 
have to tone him down.  You can't file this kind of 
lawsuit that you filed here just because Mr. Burke is 
upset.  That's ridiculous. 
  
opinion and order regarding these matters on November 2, 1993.  
Charter Techs., Inc., d.b.a. Elgin Elecs. v. Knox, McLaughlin, 
Gornall & Sennett, P.C. (In re Charter Techs., Inc.), 160 B.R. 
925 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.).  The bankruptcy court granted the sanction 
motion and denied FE&B's entire fees application, except for 
$15,000 which the court allowed for reimbursement of expenses.  
The bankruptcy court also granted the motion of the Committee for 
the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.  In reaching its 
decision, the bankruptcy court made the following factual 
findings. 
 First, the bankruptcy court found that "[t]he evidence 
establishing that Fustine and the Knox Firm represented the 
Committee, and only the Committee, is overwhelming."  Charter 
Techs., 160 B.R. at 927.  In this regard, the bankruptcy court 
further found that "[t]he Debtor failed to present any evidence 
that Fustine and the Knox Firm represented any individual member 
of the Committee."  Id.   
 Second, the bankruptcy court found that "[t]he overwhelming 
evidence supports the fact that the language of the June 4th 
letter accurately reflected the Committee's position."  Id. at 
928.  The bankruptcy court found that the Debtor's allegations to 
the contrary were based upon "a complete lack of evidence."  Id.  
The Debtor had attempted to prove that the June 4th letter was a 
vehicle designed to further the interests of individual members 
of the Committee, rather than a statement of the consensus of the 
Committee.  Towards this end, the Debtor alleged in its complaint 
that two Committee members--Robert E. Miller and Frank 
  
Slurkanich--telephoned Mr. Burke and "stated that Fustine and the 
Knox Firm were not authorized to send the June 4th letter and 
that it does not represent the position or opinion of the 
Committee."  Id.  The bankruptcy court found, however, that Mr. 
Slurkanich--a former employee of the Debtor--never denied the 
authority of Mr. Fustine to send the June 4th letter.  Instead, 
Mr. Slurkanich merely indicated that he did not personally "put 
out" the letter.  Furthermore, the bankruptcy court found that 
"Slurkanich did not call in response to the June 4th letter, but 
rather in response to a notice of termination as a sales 
representative which Slurkanich received from Burke on June 7, 
1993, which Burke had issued in retaliation for the Committee's 
June 4th letter!"  Id.  The bankruptcy court found, moreover, 
that the Committee had objectively sound reasons for wishing to 
replace Mr. Burke.4        
 Third, the bankruptcy court summarily rejected the Debtor's 
defamation allegations.  The Debtor had claimed that Mr. Fustine 
and the Knox firm stated falsely that the Debtor had accumulated 
$1,600,000 in pre-tax losses since October 1989 and that the 
Debtor had nonetheless paid $315,000 in stock dividends over that 
same time period.  The bankruptcy court found that it was 
"readily determin[able]" through the Debtor's own financial 
                     
     
4
  The bankruptcy court cited a draft report prepared by the 
accounting firm of Ernst & Young for a potential investor which 
"identified numerous management deficiencies from which it would 
have been reasonable for the Committee to determine the need to 
replace Burke."  Id. 
  
records that these statements were "true and accurate."  Id. at 
929. 
 Fourth, the bankruptcy court found that there was 
"absolutely no evidence" to support the Debtor's allegation that 
Mr. Fustine breached an agreement that he had allegedly entered 
into that forbade him from meeting with potential investors in 
the Debtor.  Id.  According to the complaint, Mr. Fustine 
breached this agreement when he met with Vito Casoni and George 
Leone of SMG Control Systems.  As the bankruptcy court found, 
this meeting took place on May 20, 1993.  The earliest date that 
Mr. Fellheimer discussed such an agreement with Mr. Fustine, 
however, according to Mr. Fellheimer's own time sheets, was May 
21, 1993--one day after the alleged breach of the agreement took 
place. 
 Fifth, the bankruptcy court found that, contrary to the 
assertion in the Debtor's complaint, the statements of Mr. 
Fustine to Mr. Casoni of SMG Control Systems did not cause SMG 
Control Systems to lower its bid for the Debtor.  Id.  As the 
bankruptcy court noted, the affidavit of Mr. Casoni submitted by 
the Debtor explicitly states that "the session of May 20th with 
Mr. Fustine did not alter SMG's offer as to price."  The 
bankruptcy court also found that Mr. Fustine did not, as further 
asserted in the complaint, cause Kulicke & Soffa to withdraw its 
business from the Debtor.  Id.  As indicated by the affidavit of 
Jim King of Kulicke & Soffa, that firm "retracted business from 
the debtor as a result of the debtor's inability to fulfill 
Kulicke & Soffa's production schedule on time and serious 
  
problems we perceive in the debtor's quality and recycling 
procedure."  The bankruptcy court found that FE&B had not 
bothered to contact Mr. Casoni, or anyone at Kulicke & Soffa, to 
ascertain the veracity of these allegations before filing the 
complaint.  Id.   
 Last, the bankruptcy court was greatly offended by Mr. 
Fellheimer's misrepresentation to it that Mr. Burke would be out 
of the country and unable to attend the hearing on the complaint 
on the day it was originally scheduled.  Id. at 929-30.  After 
noting that FE&B had made six telephone calls to the Debtor on 
July 6, including at least one direct call between Mr. Fellheimer 
and Mr. Burke, the bankruptcy court concluded:  "There is no 
rational basis favorable to Fellheimer as to why he would 
represent to the Court on July 6 that he thought Burke was in 
England and unavailable for the scheduled hearing on July 8."  
Id. at 930. 
 On the strength of these preliminary findings, the 
bankruptcy court determined that sanctions against FE&B were 
appropriate: 
 Debtor's counsel failed to make any reasonable inquiry 
into the underlying facts before filing the within 
Complaint.  Debtor's counsel knew or should have known 
that many of the allegations were baseless without any 
inquiry. . . . 
 
  . . . . 
 
  . . . The conclusion is inescapable that the 
purpose of the Complaint was to separate the Committee 
from its chosen counsel due to the fact that counsel 
for the Committee was advocating the Committee's 
position that it would be appropriate to remove Burke 
from upper-level management. 
  
 
  . . . . 
 
  In short, Fellheimer filed a lawsuit against the 
attorneys for the Creditors' Committee seeking $4.25 
million in damages for the sole purpose of protecting 
his real client, Burke, from the legitimate actions of 
the Creditors' Committee in opposing Burke's management 
of the Debtor's business. . . . 
 
  We further conclude that Fellheimer never had any 
intent to proceed with a trial on the merits of this 
complaint.  He knew when he filed the Complaint that 
the allegations were unsupported.  His scheme was to 
file the Complaint, demand the $4.25 million from the 
Creditors' Committee counsel, and then delay a hearing 
on the merits while he used the lawsuit as a wedge to 
intimidate the Creditor's Committee and its counsel for 
the benefit of Burke. . . . That illicit purpose plus 
the total lack of any evidentiary basis for the serious 
accusations made in the Complaint cry out for judicial 
recognition and appropriate sanction. 
Id. at 930-32. 
 After discussing the nature and scope of Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Bankruptcy Rule 9011, the 
bankruptcy court decided to deny FE&B its entire fee in the case.  
Although FE&B had arguably performed some services of value to 
the Debtor, the bankruptcy court did not allow it any 
compensation because "Fellheimer's inappropriate conduct affected 
and continues to affect this entire case.  Both the Debtor and 
its counsel have exhibited conduct of dishonesty, incompetency 
and gross mismanagement of the affairs of the Debtor."  Id. at 
933. 
 B. The District Court 
 FE&B then appealed the imposition of sanctions to the 
district court.  Before the district court, FE&B argued primarily 
  
that the bankruptcy court's decision to impose Rule 11 and 
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 sanctions was factually unsupported and that 
FE&B's filing of the complaint was justified.  FE&B also argued 
that the bankruptcy court had erred by imposing Rule 11 and 
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 sanctions upon the entire firm of FE&B, 
instead of merely upon the individual attorney who had signed the 
complaint, Mr. Eichen. 
 The district court first found that the record supported the 
bankruptcy court's findings regarding the factual baselessness of 
each of the complaint's material allegations.  The district court 
also found that the record supported the finding that FE&B filed 
the complaint for an improper purpose and in subjective bad 
faith. 
 The district court did, however, agree with FE&B that Rule 
11 and Bankruptcy Rule 9011 sanctions, as they then existed,5 
could only be imposed upon the individual attorney who had signed 
the offending document.  See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989).  The district court 
nonetheless affirmed the imposition of sanctions on the following 
alternative grounds:  (1) FE&B waived the right to contest the 
imposition of sanctions against it as a firm by failing to raise 
the issue in the bankruptcy court and by failing to include the 
issue in its Bankruptcy Rule 8006 statement of issues for 
                     
     
5
  Effective December 1, 1993, after the bankruptcy court 
had issued its opinion and order in this case, Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to explicitly allow 
the imposition of sanctions against law firms. 
  
appellate review; (2) the imposition of sanctions represented a 
proper exercise of the bankruptcy court's inherent power to 
sanction; and (3) the imposition of sanctions represented a 
proper exercise of the bankruptcy court's authority under 11 
U.S.C. § 328(c)6 to deny professional fees in appropriate cases.  
Appeal to this court followed.  
 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 Because the district court sat as an appellate court in 
reviewing this matter, our own review of that court's factual and 
legal determinations is plenary.  Universal Minerals, Inc. v. 
C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1981).  In 
reviewing the bankruptcy court's determinations, we exercise the 
same standard of review as the district court.  Brown v. 
Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d 
Cir. 1988).   
 We may not set aside the bankruptcy court's factual findings 
unless we first conclude that they are clearly erroneous.  
Bankruptcy Rule 8013; Brown, 851 F.2d at 84 (citation omitted).  
As we have stated before in other contexts, the clearly erroneous 
standard is fairly stringent:  "It is the responsibility of an 
                     
     
6
  Section 328(c) provides: 
 
 [T]he court may deny allowance of compensation for 
services and reimbursement of expenses of a 
professional person employed under section 327 or 1103 
of this title if, at any time during such professional 
person's employment under section 327 or 1103 of this 
title, such professional person is not a disinterested 
person, or represents or holds an interest adverse to 
the interest of the estate with respect to the matter 
on which such professional person is employed. 
  
appellate court to accept the ultimate factual determination of 
the fact-finder unless that determination either is completely 
devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility or bears no rational relationship to the supportive 
evidentiary data."  Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 703 F.2d 722, 725 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).  Furthermore, in reviewing the 
bankruptcy court's factual findings we are to give "due regard" 
to the opportunity of that court to judge first-hand the 
credibility of witnesses.  Bankruptcy Rule 8013.  Our review of 
the bankruptcy court's legal determinations is plenary.  Brown, 
851 F.2d at 84.   
 In our review of the imposition of sanctions, the primary 
question before us is whether the sanctioning court abused its 
discretion.  See, e.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 
384, 405 (1990) ("[A]n appellate court should apply an abuse-of-
discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district 
court's Rule 11 determination."); Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 
U.S. 32, 55 (1991) ("We review a court's imposition of sanctions 
under its inherent power for abuse of discretion.").  We do not 
seek to determine whether we would have applied the sanction 
ourselves in the first instance.  See Eavenson, Auchmuty & 
Greenwald v. Holtzman, 775 F.2d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 1985) 
 IV. DISCUSSION 
 As discussed above, the bankruptcy court acted pursuant to 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Bankruptcy 
Rule 9011 when it sanctioned FE&B by denying FE&B's fees 
application.  All parties are in agreement, however, that 
  
sanctions could not properly be imposed against law firms under 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the version of Rule 11 then 
in effect.  See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 
493 U.S. 120 (1989) (holding that Rule 11 sanctions may only be 
imposed upon the attorney who actually signs the documents in 
question).  The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's 
denial of FE&B's fees application despite that court's 
misapplication of Rule 11 by finding three alternative grounds 
for upholding the sanction.  The district court did so after 
noting the Supreme Court's long-standing holding that "'[i]n the 
review of judicial proceedings the rule is settled that if the 
decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the 
lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.'"  
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 459 (1953) (quoting Helvering v. 
Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)) (other citation omitted).  Of 
the three grounds provided by the district court, we find the 
characterization of this sanction as an exercise of the 
bankruptcy court's inherent power to be the most appropriate 
justification under these circumstances and it is to this ground 
that we first turn. 
 A. Inherent Power to Sanction 
 In Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), the Supreme 
Court addressed the nature and scope of the federal courts' 
inherent power to control the conduct of those who appear before 
them.  The Court began by surveying its long history of case law 
in this area:  "It has long been understood that '[c]ertain 
implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice 
  
from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be 
dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the 
exercise of all others.'"  Id. at 43 (quoting United States v. 
Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)) (other citation omitted).  Among 
the implied and "'incidental'" powers of a federal court is the 
power "to discipline attorneys who appear before it."  Id. 
(quoting Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529, 531 (1824)).  Included 
among the types of sanctionable conduct discussed by Chambers are 
those cases where 
 a party has "'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, 
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.'" . . . The 
imposition of sanctions in this instance transcends a 
court's equitable power concerning relations between 
the parties and reaches a court's inherent power to 
police itself, thus serving the dual purpose of 
"vindicat[ing] judicial authority without resort to the 
more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court 
and mak[ing] the prevailing party whole for expenses 
caused by his opponent's obstinacy." 
Id. at 45-46 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  See 
also Gillette Foods Inc. v. Bayernwald-Fruchteverwertung, 977 
F.2d 809, 813 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Chambers).  "Because of 
their very potency," however, the federal courts must be careful 
to exercise their inherent powers "with restraint and 
discretion."  Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44.  "A primary aspect of 
that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction 
for conduct which abuses the judicial process."  Id. at 44-45.  
In this case, the bankruptcy court determined that denying FE&B's 
entire fees application constituted an appropriate sanction. 
 We first note here that the advent of Rule 11 and the other 
statutory sanctions did not eviscerate the courts' inherent power 
  
to sanction:  "[W]hereas each of the other mechanisms reaches 
only certain individuals or conduct, the inherent power extends 
to a full range of litigation abuses.  At the very least, the 
inherent power must continue to exist to fill in the 
interstices."  Id. at 46.  Moreover, we have previously rejected 
the proposition "that once a claim is held not to violate Rule 
11, the court is prevented from imposing sanctions under its 
inherent power."  Gillette Foods, 977 F.2d at 813. 
 Against this backdrop, FE&B challenges the bankruptcy 
court's exercise of its inherent sanction power on two main 
grounds.  First, FE&B argues that this result deprives FE&B of 
due process because the bankruptcy court indicated that it was 
exclusively acting pursuant to Rule 11 and Bankruptcy Rule 9011.  
Second, FE&B argues on the merits that the record is insufficient 
to support the finding that it acted in bad faith during the 
course of its representation of the Debtor. 
 1. Due Process   
 The key to FE&B's due process claim is the distinction 
between Rule 11 sanctions and inherent power sanctions--if these 
sanctions were identical in all respects, particularized notice 
as to one sanction would arguably suffice to fully inform FE&B as 
to the pendency of the other sanction.  Rule 11 sanctions and 
inherent power sanctions do, of course, differ markedly in at 
least one aspect pertinent to this case:  Invocation of a federal 
court's inherent power to sanction requires a finding of bad 
faith.  Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49; Landon v. Hunt, 938 F.2d 450, 
454 (3d Cir. 1991).  The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, on the 
  
other hand, requires only a showing of objectively unreasonable 
conduct.  E.g., Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 
604, 616 (3d Cir. 1991).      
 We have previously held that "[p]rior to sanctioning an 
attorney, a court must provide the party to be sanctioned with 
notice of and some opportunity to respond to the charges" in 
order to satisfy the requirements of due process.  Jones v. 
Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(citations omitted).  Moreover, we have stated that "we think 
particularized notice is required to comport with due process."  
Id. (citation omitted).  FE&B has raised a fairly significant 
argument here as the bankruptcy court never indicated that it was 
acting under its inherent sanction power in this case.  Indeed, 
neither the motion for sanctions nor the bankruptcy court ever 
mentioned any ground for sanctions other than Rule 11 and 
Bankruptcy Rule 9011.  As discussed above, it was the district 
court that first justified the bankruptcy court's conduct on the 
ground of the inherent power to sanction.  Nonetheless, we agree 
with the district court's reasoning and we likewise find that 
justifying the bankruptcy court's conduct on that ground does not 
violate FE&B's right to due process on the record of this case. 
 We do not intend to disturb the line of case law cited to by 
FE&B in its brief.  See Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.3d 58, 64 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Landon, 938 F.2d at 454; Jones, 899 F.2d at 1357-58; 
Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Eavenson, Auchmuty & Greenwald, 775 F.2d at 540-41; Eash v. 
Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1985).  
  
Rather, our holding is a narrow one, compelled by our finding 
that FE&B was provided with sufficient, advance notice of exactly 
which conduct was alleged to be sanctionable and, furthermore, 
that FE&B was aware that it stood accused of having acted in bad 
faith. 
 (a) Particularized Notice 
 In Jones we stated that the reason behind the particularized 
notice requirement was to put "a party . . . on notice as to the 
particular factors that he must address if he is to avoid 
sanctions."  Jones, 899 F.2d at 1357.  Generally speaking, 
particularized notice will usually require notice of the precise 
sanctioning tool that the court intends to employ.  In Jones, as 
was the case here, the sanctioned attorney was initially informed 
that only Rule 11 sanctions were being considered.  Id.  Only 
when the sanctioned attorney received the district court's order 
was he informed that sanctions were also being imposed pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1927,7 which has been interpreted to require a 
finding of bad faith conduct.  Id.  On appeal, we vacated the 
imposition of sanctions under § 1927 because the sanctioned 
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  § 1927.  Counsel's liability for excessive costs 
 
  Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct 
cases in any court of the United States or any 
Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in 
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required 
by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 
expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred 
because of such conduct. 
  
attorney had not been provided with sufficient notice that his 
subjective bad faith was in question.8 
 The situation confronting the sanctioned attorney in Jones 
is to be contrasted with the situation facing FE&B:  First, the 
sanction motion filed by Mr. Fustine, the Knox firm, and the 
Committee explicitly charges FE&B with bad faith in the filing of 
the complaint on behalf of the debtor.  Specifically, the 
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  The motion for sanctions filed by the sanctioned 
attorney's opponents pursuant to Rule 11 was hinged primarily 
upon procedural noncompliance:  "[The motion] alleged that 
plaintiff had failed to file a pre-trial statement, to submit a 
RICO case statement, to answer interrogatories, to produce 
documents requested and to conduct any discovery and that 
plaintiff had had no factual basis for the RICO count."  Id. at 
1353.  This request for sanctions was reiterated on at least two 
occasions, but again these requests were insufficient to put the 
attorney on notice of the fact that he stood accused of having 
acted in subjective bad faith:  The first reiteration "recited 
that it sought dismissal and fees based upon plaintiff's 'conduct 
of [the] litigation in general,' including the failure to answer 
interrogatories, failure to file a RICO case statement or pre-
trial statement and failure to produce requested documents."  Id. 
at 1354. 
 
 The sanctioned attorney's answer to his opponent's motion 
for counsel fees--which constituted his sole opportunity to 
respond to the question of sanctions--was insufficient to 
demonstrate that he was on notice that he stood accused of more 
than objectively unreasonable conduct.  His response merely 
repeated the requirements of Rule 11: 
 
 In response to the charge of having violated Rule 11, 
appellant asserted that he "believed throughout a large 
portion of the instant litigation . . . that the 
Complaint was warranted by existing law; that, 
alternatively, it was warranted by good faith arguments 
for extension, modification or reversal of existing 
laws; and that it was not interposed for delay or 
needless increase in cost of litigation." 
 
Id. 
  
sanction motion charges that FE&B was actually aware of, or had 
at least remained deliberately indifferent to, the factual and 
legal baselessness of the complaint.   
 Second, and much more importantly, the bankruptcy court also 
made it clear that it suspected FE&B of having acted in bad faith 
both in its representation of the debtor's interests and in the 
filing of the complaint.  At the conclusion of the August 3, 1993 
hearing on the Debtor's complaint, after Mr. Fellheimer had 
sought to withdraw the complaint, the bankruptcy court first 
stated that it believed that FE&B was representing the interests 
of Mr. Burke over the interests of the Debtor:  "[Y]ou're on a 
knife's edge, Mr. Fellheimer.  You're representing Mr. Burke . . 
. . And that's adverse to the interests of the [Debtor]. . . . 
[T]o the extent that you represent [Mr. Burke] to the detriment 
of the [Debtor] and the creditors, you're violating your 
fiduciary duty to the [Debtor]."  The bankruptcy court then 
stated its belief that FE&B had filed the complaint in bad faith:  
"[F]or Mr. Burke to get upset because the creditors committee 
thinks that he's incompetent, is unfortunate.  You . . . have to 
tone him down.  You can't file this kind of lawsuit that you 
filed here just because Mr. Burke is upset.  That's ridiculous. . 
. . [T]his whole litigation is a lot of nonsense."  The 
bankruptcy court even indicated the nature of the sanction that 
it was considering:  "[Y]ou're representing [Mr. Burke] 
individually and you're risking whatever fee you might get out of 
this." 
  
 If the bankruptcy court had then and there conducted a 
hearing on the sanction motion, FE&B would arguably possess a 
stronger due process argument--this is the key factor which 
distinguishes this case from Jones.  In Jones, the record was 
insufficient to demonstrate that the sanctioned attorney had 
advance notice that the sanctioning court was contemplating the 
imposition of sanctions which hinged upon a finding of bad faith.  
In this case, FE&B had over eleven weeks once it had learned of 
the bankruptcy court's leanings on this matter--until October 20, 
1993--to prepare for the hearing on the sanctions motion.  In the 
words of our Jones opinion, we can say "with reasonable assurance 
on this record" that FE&B was "on notice as to the particular 
factors that [it had to] address if [it was] to avoid sanctions."  
Jones, 899 F.2d at 1357.  Furthermore, it appears evident from 
Mr. Fellheimer's soliloquy at the October 20, 1993 hearing that 
he was fully aware of what he and FE&B were up against: 
  I have been searching in vain for a way to stop it 
or to get away from it.  I want to tell the Court.  I 
don't want this Court to think that I'm standing here, 
that I believe what happened was right.  I believe it 
was wrong.  If I had it to do over again, I would do it 
differently.  And I can promise you, whatever you 
decide to do, it won't happen again.  I would approach 
it differently and I would make sure my firm approaches 
it differently.  I'm very unhappy with the way it came 
out.  I will tell you that there were a lot better ways 
to resolve that problem than the one we selected.  And 
I want to acknowledge that to you and admit that to 
Your Honor and admit to Your Honor that the result was 
bad.  For that I apologize. 
 
  . . . .  
 
  . . . I would like to step aside.  Whatever I'm to 
pay, I'll pay.  Whatever fee I'm paid, I'll take, and 
step aside in the interest of all.  I don't think it's 
  
good for this to just go on and on.  It doesn't 
accomplish anything for this debtor. . . . 
 
  . . . . 
 
  And I want to publicly say to Guy Fustine in the 
courtroom, I think we were wrong in filing the 
Complaint.  And maybe I'm handing it to Mr. Lanzillo.  
And I will, if that's what it is.  I apologize to you 
publicly.  I think we got carried away with the problem 
and we went too far, and for that I apologize.  And 
whatever the Court decides to do, I will accept. 
 Therefore, we hold that the record adequately demonstrates 
that FE&B was sufficiently on notice that it faced allegations of 
having acted in subjective bad faith. 
 (b) Opportunity to be Heard 
 The requirements of due process also require a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard.  See, e.g., Simmerman, 27 F.3d at 64.  
This requirement is especially important in cases such as this 
where a law firm's reputation is at stake:   
  Sanctions are not to be assessed without full and 
fair consideration by the court.  They often entail a 
fine which may have more than a token effect upon an 
attorney's resources.  More importantly, they act as a 
symbolic statement about the quality and integrity of 
an attorney's work--a statement which may have tangible 
effect upon the attorney's career. 
Id.  As discussed above, once the bankruptcy court had made its 
position regarding FE&B's conduct clear, FE&B had over eleven 
weeks before the hearing to further brief the issue.  FE&B was 
then afforded ample opportunity to be heard at the hearing 
itself--the transcript of the October 20, 1993 hearing stretches 
on for 321 pages.  Based on this record, we cannot find that FE&B 
was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
  
 (c) Conclusion 
 Ideally, there would have been some explicit indication here 
that the bankruptcy court was acting pursuant to its inherent 
sanction power.  We refuse, however, to go along with FE&B's 
argument and overturn the bankruptcy court's decision merely 
because that court applied the wrong label to the righteous use 
of its inherent sanction power.  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 459 (1953) (citations omitted).  We do not expect, however, 
that the result reached here will be often justified in future 
cases where the sanctioned party was not explicitly informed 
beforehand of the precise ground for the imposition of sanctions.  
To summarize, our finding here was primarily driven by (1) the 
bankruptcy court's clear warning to FE&B eleven weeks prior to 
the hearing on the sanctions; and (2) the evidence pertaining to 
FE&B's actual awareness of the nature of the charges pending 
against it, such as Mr. Fellheimer's statements at the October 
20, 1993 hearing. 
 2. Sanctions Under the Court's Inherent Power  
 FE&B also argues on the merits that the record is 
insufficient to support a finding of bad faith.  As discussed 
above, a finding of bad faith is required to support a court's 
employment of its inherent sanction power.  Chambers, 501 U.S. at 
49 (citations omitted).   
 We first note that, contrary to FE&B's assertions, the 
bankruptcy court did find that FE&B had acted in bad faith in the 
course of its representation of the debtor: 
  
 The conclusion is inescapable that the purpose of the 
Complaint was to separate the Committee from its chosen 
counsel due to the fact that counsel for the Committee 
was advocating the Committee's position that it would 
be appropriate to remove Burke from upper-level 
management. 
 
  . . . Fellheimer . . . abandoned his fiduciary 
obligations as counsel to the Debtor corporation and . 
. . undert[ook] representation of Burke, individually.  
As Burke's attorney in such circumstances, he was 
hostile to the Debtor corporation and its creditors. 
 
  . . . . 
 
  In short, Fellheimer filed a lawsuit against the 
attorneys for the Creditors' Committee seeking $4.25 
million in damages for the sole purpose of protecting 
his real client, Burke, from the legitimate actions of 
the Creditors' Committee in opposing Burke's management 
of the Debtor's business. . . . Viewed in this light, 
the actions of Fellheimer as an officer of the Court in 
violating his fiduciary duties and in bringing such an 
action are absolutely not to be condoned.  We view it 
as a disgrace to the legal community which we otherwise 
hold in high regard.   
 
  We further conclude that Fellheimer never had any 
intent to proceed with a trial on the merits of this 
complaint.  He knew when he filed the Complaint that 
the allegations were unsupported.  His scheme was to 
file the Complaint, demand the $4.25 million from the 
Creditors' Committee counsel, and then delay a hearing 
on the merits while he used the lawsuit as a wedge to 
intimidate the Creditors' Committee and its counsel in 
his negotiations with it for the benefit of Burke. 
Charter Techs., 160 B.R. at 931.  We may not disturb these 
findings, nor may we disturb the bankruptcy court's preliminary 
findings which led up to them, unless we first find that they are 
clearly erroneous.  Brown, 851 F.2d at 84.  Since FE&B offers 
nothing but tepid contradictions in rebuttal, we must affirm the 
bankruptcy court's findings, which are sufficient to support its 
  
conclusion that FE&B did act with bad faith in the proceedings 
below. 
 Second, we take note of the Supreme Court's cautionary 
language in Chambers:   
 [W]hen there is bad-faith conduct in the course of 
litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under 
the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the 
Rules rather than the inherent power.  But if in the 
informed discretion of the court, neither the statute 
nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely 
rely on its inherent power. 
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50.  In this case, only Mr. Eichen of FE&B 
could be properly sanctioned under the versions of Rule 11 and 
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 then in effect as only Mr. Eichen actually 
signed the complaint.  It is evident, however, that the 
bankruptcy court imposed firm-wide sanctions because it felt that 
other attorneys at FE&B, particularly Mr. Fellheimer, were 
primarily responsible for the sanctionable conduct.9  Indeed, Mr. 
Fellheimer himself testified as to his primary role in the filing 
of the complaint at the October 20, 1993 hearing:  "Your Honor 
told me what he thought of [the complaint] at the time when we 
withdrew it.  And I bear full responsibility for it, Your Honor."  
We cannot conclude, after reviewing this record, that the 
bankruptcy court abused its discretion by employing its inherent 
power to sanction the entire firm of FE&B. 
 B. Denial of Fees Under 11 U.S.C. § 328(c) 
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  We have previously recognized that a court may employ its 
inherent sanction power to reach attorneys who did not personally 
sign the document in question.  See Gillette Foods, 977 F.2d at 
813. 
  
 We also find that the denial of FE&B's fees application may 
be upheld as a proper exercise of the bankruptcy court's 
authority under 11 U.S.C. § 328(c).  Section 328(c) authorizes 
the bankruptcy court, in its discretion, to deny a professional 
person's request for fees if that person "represents or holds an 
interest adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to 
the matter on which such professional person is employed."  While 
it is true that the bankruptcy court did not indicate that it was 
acting pursuant to § 328(c), the bankruptcy court did explicitly 
find that FE&B had represented the interests of Mr. Burke, which 
were adverse to the Debtor's interests:  "Fellheimer . . . 
abandoned his fiduciary obligations as counsel to the Debtor 
corporation and . . . undert[ook] representation of Burke, 
individually.  As Burke's attorney in such circumstances, he was 
hostile to the Debtor corporation and its creditors."  Charter 
Techs., 160 B.R. at 931.  Having already concluded that the 
bankruptcy court's underlying factual findings in this regard are 
not clearly erroneous, we find that the denial of FE&B's fees 
application may be upheld as an exercise of the bankruptcy 
court's authority under § 328(c).   
  In light of our finding that the denial of FE&B's fees 
application may be upheld as a proper exercise of the bankruptcy 
court's inherent sanction power, and that the sanctions may 
alternatively be upheld under 11 U.S.C. § 328(c), we need not 
address the third ground provided by the district court for 
upholding the sanctions--namely, that FE&B waived its right to 
contest the imposition of sanctions.  In this regard, we note 
  
only that we would require a fairly persuasive showing that FE&B 
had waived the right to contest a matter as important as Rule 11 
sanctions, given the effect that such sanctions may have upon a 
law firm's primary stock in trade--its reputation. 
 C. Amount of the Sanction 
 As discussed above, the bankruptcy court sanctioned FE&B by 
denying FE&B's entire fees application, except for $15,000 for 
reimbursement of expenses.  In its initial brief before this 
court, FE&B claims that the total amount of compensation due to 
it amounts to approximately $260,000.  This figure represents 
$167,246.50 allegedly accrued from January 20, 1993, through 
August 21, 1993,10 plus $92,169 which allegedly accrued from 
August 22, 1993, through December 15, 1993.  As the district 
court noted, however, there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that FE&B ever submitted a fees application to the bankruptcy 
court for this latter time period.  Therefore, FE&B's claim for 
fees for this latter time period is not properly before this 
court.  Thus, our review of the bankruptcy court's denial of 
FE&B's fees application reaches only the amount attributable to 
the period before August 22, 1993:  $167,246.50.  Needless to 
say, absent the sanction, FE&B would not necessarily have 
received even this reduced amount:  The Committee, for example, 
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  FE&B had attempted to appease the bankruptcy court by 
"sanctioning itself" for the filing of the complaint.  FE&B had 
accordingly subtracted $33,029--the amount attributable to the 
filing of the complaint--from its original request of $200,275.50 
for this time period. 
  
had hotly contested FE&B's hourly rates as they exceeded those 
normally charged in that area. 
 FE&B contests the bankruptcy court's decision to deny its 
entire fees application on the ground that it did perform at 
least some services of value to the Debtor.  Assuming arguendo 
that FE&B has performed services of value to the Debtor, we 
nonetheless uphold the sanctions in their entirety.   
 The bankruptcy court justified its decision to deny FE&B's 
entire fees application as follows:  "[A]ny fees to be collected 
by [Fellheimer] shall be collected from his real client, Burke. . 
. . Fellheimer's inappropriate conduct affected and continues to 
affect this entire case.  Both the Debtor and its counsel have 
exhibited conduct of dishonesty, incompetency and gross 
mismanagement of the affairs of the Debtor."  Charter Techs., 160 
B.R. at 932-33.  Based on the extensive record of wrongdoing 
documented by the bankruptcy court, which we have already upheld, 
we cannot find this result to be clearly erroneous.  Accordingly, 
we must affirm the denial of FE&B's entire fees application. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
 For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
district court upholding the decision of the bankruptcy court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Technologies, 
Inc., d/b/a Elgin Electronics; Knox, McLaughlin, Gornall & 
Sennett, P.C.; and Guy C. Fustine, Esquire, No. 94-3461. 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 The majority opinion is quite powerful and thorough, and 
almost entirely convincing.  It would have my full joinder were 
the sanction it approves not so very large -- on this record it 
could apparently amount to more than $167,000.  I cannot conceive 
that we would approve a sanction which required FE&B to actually 
pay anywhere near that amount under the facts of this case.  
While I acknowledge that we deal here with deprivation of a fee 
rather than an ordinary out-of-pocket payment, that difference is 
not, to me, of great legal significance.  Accordingly, while I 
agree with the majority that the bankruptcy court was warranted 
in assessing a sanction against FE&B, and concur in the 
majority’s opinion to that extent, I believe the court abused its 
discretion if in fact the sanction imposed was as high as 
$167,000 (the fees requested by FE&B), given the nature of the 
conduct involved.  
 I do not attempt to put a much different cast than does the 
majority on FE&B's offending conduct (though I think the question 
whether it was conflicted between its apparent representation of 
Mr. Burke and the debtor to be far closer than does the 
majority).11  My position is instead impelled by the fact that I 
                     
     
11In my view, FE&B could have reasonably concluded that 
successful reorganization of the debtor hinged on the retention 
of Mr. Burke.  Nevertheless, I cannot say that the bankruptcy 
court's finding of a conflict was clearly erroneous. 
  
find the opinions of the bankruptcy court, the district court, 
and the majority to be either silent or unconvincing on one of 
the most critical aspects of the decision to deny FE&B its fees -
- the contribution vel non of FE&B to the reorganization.  The 
record is not sufficiently developed as to this point and I 
suspect that the efforts of FE&B had far more to do with the 
ultimately successful reorganization, albeit sans Mr. Burke, than 
their adversaries admit or the other reviewing judges in this 
case apparently believe.  Moreover, the bankruptcy court's 
apparent finding that FE&B demonstrated "incompetency and gross 
mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor," is, in my view, 
unsupported on the record and clearly erroneous.  Indeed, the 
majority's affirmance of that finding is wholly conclusory.   
 I agree that the filing of the lawsuit against the Knox firm was 
outrageous.12  I also agree that the bankruptcy court’s finding 
of a conflict by FE&B and Mr. Fellheimer's temporizing about the 
availability of Mr. Burke justify a large sanction.  But, in view 
of the totality of circumstances, I cannot agree that the 
bankruptcy court could be justified in imposing a sanction 
anywhere near as high as $167,000, even given our deferential 
review.  Accordingly, I would vacate the challenged order, remand 
the case to the bankruptcy court for a finding as to the value of 
FE&B’s fee absent sanction, and then permit the court to take 
                     
     
12I say this even though it is not as clear to me as it is 
to the majority that FE&B lacked a colorable basis, at least at 
one point, to allege a conflict in the Knox firm's 
representation. 
  
another look at the matter and appropriately reduce that award, 
pursuant to its inherent authority,13 as a sanction for FE&B’s 
conduct.  To this extent, I respectfully dissent.  
                     
     
13The majority also rests its decision on the bankruptcy 
court’s power to deny fees under 11 U.S.C.A. § 328(c) (1993), 
which provides that "the court may deny allowance of compensation 
for services . . . if, at any time . . . such professional person 
is not a disinterested person, or represents or holds an interest 
adverse to the interest of the estate with respect to the matter 
on which such professional person is employed."  While this 
section might have justified a complete denial of FE&B’s fees in 
this case, I cannot join in affirming this sanction as a proper 
exercise of the bankruptcy court’s discretion under § 328(c),  
since, as the majority recognizes the bankruptcy court did not 
rely on § 328(c) in imposing this sanction on FE&B. 
